Through publically concurred laws that compare to a typical arrangement of public limitations, the ‘individuals as a sovereign body’ serves to secure against infringement of individual liberty and authoritarian force. Where no such basic body exists, people are denied of this assurance. In such cases, people must obey without liberty, while people with significant influence order under a condition of permit. Neoliberal scholars keep up that any regular character, with its relating set of public and discretionary positive and negative limitations on liberty, sabotages singular liberty. Neoliberal hypothesis just takes into consideration private limitations on liberty. Against these neoliberal suspicions, we contend that dismissing public limitations on liberty doesn’t advance individual liberty. Despite what might be expected, it makes conditions in which free people become subservient and political imbalance gets settled in, where residents are partitioned into the individuals who obey and the individuals who order. Following the results of neo liberalism, we contend that except if we pay attention to both the individuals as a political classification and the option to rise to and complementary pressure, singular liberty will be in danger. The article contends that neo liberalism at last prompts the complete avoidance of specific residents under the cloak of full liberty. With the evaporating of individuals’ will comes the absolute vanishing of specific residents, who live in an unconstrained society as though they were stateless or rebellious people. To all the more likely comprehend the associations between the dismissal of the idea of the individuals, private limitations on liberty and the cultivating of the subservient resident, this paper thinks about the political way of thinking of Hayek and Nozick. It likewise thinks about key thoughts from Locke and Kant—scholars who, notwithstanding the contrasts between their philosophical points of view, and in spite of the way that the two of them gave urgent motivation to Hayek’s political economy and Nozick’s libertarianism, focused on the defensive part of the individuals concerning singular liberty. To the extent that the defensive capacity of the administration and the positive law incorporates both authoritative and coercive force, rather than constraining others for the well-being of one’s own, neoliberal positive liberty permits private people to force, without assent, public limitations for their private advantages. Neoliberal positive liberty along these lines prompts the foundation of lawful and political disparity: some orders without assent, i.e., without limitation, while others obey without assent, i.e., without liberty. At last, utilizing the advantages of negative liberty relies upon the (political) attribution to people of certain lawful and political statuses, under which they can utilize their liberty. Besides, the positive liberty that underlies the unconstrained request not just denies certain residents of a lot of the overall prosperity yet additionally leaves no space to guarantee a privilege against that hardship. Other than securing negative liberty in the expansion of people’s prosperity, this request doesn’t give any solid rights. Rather than ensuring singular liberty, the dismissal of the “fantasy” of individuals takes into consideration the rise of two natural political statuses, initially sent in neoliberal political society: the individuals who live under free self-serfdom from one perspective and the imperceptible and voiceless on the other.